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Abstract
This document presents the final report of the thesis “Telecommunication Fraud Detection Using
Data Mining Techniques”, were a study is made over the effect of the unbalanced class data,
generated by the Telecommunications Industry, in the performance of the classification algorithm
Naive Bayes. In this subject, an unbalanced class data set is characterized by an uneven class
distribution where the amount of fraudulent instances (positive class) is substantially smaller than
the amount normal instances (negative class). This will result in a classifier which is most likely
to classify data belonging to the normal class then to the fraud class. At first, an overall inspection
is made over the data characteristics and the Naive Bayes model. A feature engineering stage is
executed, with the intent to extend the information contained in the data creating a depper relation
with the data itself and algorithm characteristics. A previously proposed solution that consists
on undersampling the most abundant class (normal) before building the model, is presented and
tested. In the end, the new proposals are presented. The first proposal is to study the effects
of changing the intrinsic class distribution parameter in the Naive Bayes model and evaluate its
performance. The second proposal consists in estimating margin values that when applied to the
model output, attempt to bring more positive instances from previous negative classification. All of
these suggested models are validated over a monte-carlo experiment, using data with and without
the engineered features.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Telecommunications fraud is one of the major concerns in the telecommunications industry and
corresponds to the abusive usage of an operator infrastructure. This means that a third party
is using the resources of a carrier without the intention of paying them. This problem results
in significal damages in the financial field [1] since fraudsters are currently stealling part of the
revenue of the operators who offer these type of services [2, 3]. Others aspects of the problem that
causes loss of revenue, are the use of the identity of legitimate clients in order to commit fraud,
which result in those clients being framed for a fraud attack that they didn’t commit. This will
result in the loss of confidence of the client in their carrier, giving them reasons to leave. Besides
being victims of fraud, some clients just don’t like to work with a carrier who has been victim of
fraud attacks. Since the offering of the same services is available by multiple carriers, the client
can always switch very easily between them [4].
2005 2008 2011 2013
Estimated Global Revenue (USD) 1.2 Trillion 1.7 Trillion 2.1 Trillion 2.2 Trillion
Lost Revenue to Fraud (USD) 61.3 Billion 60.1 Billion 40.1 Billion 46.3 Billion
% Representativa 5.11% 3.54% 1.88%
Table 1.1: Annual Global Telecommunications Industry Lost Revenue
Table 1.1 displays the dimension of the "financial hole" generated by fraud in the telecommu-
nications industry and the impact of fraud in the annual revenue of the operators.
There are a couple of reasons which make the fraud in this area appealing for some fraudsters.
One is the difficulty in the tracking of the fraudster. This is very expensive process and requires
a lot of time, which makes it impractical to detect a large amount of individuals. Another reason
is the technological requirements to commit fraud in these systems. A fraudster doesn’t require a
particularly sophisticated equipment in order to practice fraud in these systems [5].
All these evidences generate the need to detect the fraudsters in the most effective way in order
to avoid future damage to the telecommunications industry.
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2 Introduction
Data mining techniques are one possible solution, since they allow the identification of fraud-
ulent activity with a certain degree of confidence. Data mining also works specially well in large
amounts of data, a characteristic of the data generated by the telecommunications companies.
1.2 Problem
Telecommunication operators store large amounts of data related with the activity of their clients.
In these records exists both normal and fraudulent activity records. It is expected for the fraudulent
activity records to be substantially less fequent than the normal activity.
The problem that arises when trying to effectively detect fraudulent behaviour in this field
is due to the effect that the class distribution (normal or fraud) has over the algorithms which
construct the classifiers. The classifier being a model that allows the classification of data as
normal or fraudulent, and therefore the main objective of the fraud detection studies.
One problematic example is the impact of the class distribution on the data used for the clas-
sifier construction algorithm, Naive Bayes. If the class distribution is highly unbalanced then the
Naive Bayes algorithm will estimate a classifier which is most likely to classify each instance be-
longing to the class which is more abundant. In this scenario, the most abundant class would be
the normal class.
1.3 Objectives
The objective of this dissertation is to study the performance of the Naive Bayes classifier in
a problem of very unbalanced data sets, concerning anomaly detection in the telecom industry.
Another goal is to investigate possible adaptations to the model in order to address the problem of
unbalanced classes.
Summarizing, the main objectives of this project are:
1. Evaluate the performance of the Naive Bayes classifier on on unbalanced data set from the
telecom industry;
2. Apply existing adaptation to the model and evaluate the performance improvements;
3. Propose a new solution to this problem;
1.4 Document Structure
The present document is divided into 5 chapters: Introduction (1), State of the Art (2), Naive Bayes
(3), Study Case (4) and Conclusion (5). In the State of the Art, a review is made on previously
studies in the area of Telecommunications fraud, Anomaly detection and Data Mining. In the
Naive Bayes chapter, is presented the standard Naive Bayes algorithm, as well as its extensions,
the adaptations and the proposed modifications. In the Case Study chapter, is presented the data,
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the methodology and the results. In the final chapter, the conclusion, an overview of the project is
given and some possibilities for future work.
4 Introduction
Chapter 2
State Of the Art
2.1 Telecommunications Fraud
Fraud is commonly described as the intent of misleading others in order to obtain personal benefits
[3]. In the telecommunications area, fraud is characterized by the abusive usage of and carrier
services without the intention of paying. In this scenario there might emerge two victims:
• Carrier — Since there are resources of the carrier that are being used by a fraudster, it
exists a direct loss of operability since those resources could be used on a legitimate client.
This will also result in the loss of revenue since this usage will not be charged.
• Client — When victim of a fraud attack, the client integrity is going to be contested in order
to detect if this is really a fraud scenario. If the client is truly the victim, then the false
alarm will compromise the confidence that the client erstwhile had in the carrier. Still some
clients might even be charged for the services that the fraudster used, therefore destroying
even further the confidence of the client on the carrier.
The practice of fraud is usually related to money, but there are some other reasons like political
motivations, personal achievements and self-preservation that motivate the fraudsters to commit
attacks [3] .
2.1.1 Historical Remarks
Since the beginning of commercial telecommunications, the fraudsters have been causing financial
damage to the companies who offered these services [6]. At the start, the carriers did not have the
dimension, or the users, that they have nowadays and so the amount of fraud cases wasn’t as big.
This could mean that the financial damage caused, wasn’t as high as it is today, but this isn’t
actually true. Indeed the amount of frauds was smaller but, the cost associated with a fraud attack
in the easlier infrastructure was greater than nowadays. Later on and due to the technological
advances, the cost of a fraud attack to the carrier has been decreasing, but conversely, the amount
of occurrences have been increasing creating a constant financial damage [3].
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700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700
700 1 2 4 7
900 3 5 8
1100 6 9 #
1300 0
1500 *
Table 2.1: Frequency-Digit correspondence on the Operator MF Pulsing
An interesting story about one of the first types of telecommunication fraud happened in 1957,
in the telephony network of AT&T. At this time AT&T was installing their first automatic PBXs
from The Bell Systems company. To access the control options of the network (e.g. call routing),
the operators would send Multiple-Frequency (MF) sound signals in 2400Hz band directly to the
telephony line, were all the other calls signalling was passing. Since the control signals could be
sent from any point of the network, this allowed users to ear and therefore try to copy those signals.
The fraud on the telephone lines that consisted on the replication by the user of those control
signals in order to use the network resources, like free calling, was denominated by phreaking
(phone + freak). The pioneer in this type of fraud was Joe Engressia, also known as Joybubbles.
He figured that, by whistling to the microphone in headset of his phone at the right frequency he
could establish a call between two users without being charged. Later on another phreaker, John
Darper, realized that the whistle offered, at the time, in the cereal box Captain Crunch, was able
to produce a perfect sound signal at the frequency required to access the control commands of the
network. This discovery gave him the nickname of Cpt. Crunch.
In the 60s The Bell Systems released the paper were the control signal were described [7].
This paper and the previous discoveries made from John Darper and Joe Engressia, allowed for
Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs (yes, the creators of apple) to create a device that allowed the
job of phreaking to become much easier. The device was named Blue Box (2.1), and it was a
simple box with a keypad and a speaker that would connect to the microphone on the telephone
headset. By pressing a key, the device emitted the corresponding sound signal trough the speaker
and therefore into the network allowing to access the control with the previous correct frequency
whistling effort. The key to MF conversion is visible in table 2.1. All these discoveries and the
invention of the blue box had a purely academic purpose, but this didn’t discouraged other people
to copy the device and abuse its purpose.
More recently, the telecommunications fraud concerns extended to another all new dimension
since the commercialization of the internet and to a whole new pack of services. New types of
fraud appeared and the operators have less control over the users. This resulted in an increased
difficulty in preventing the problem. Carriers keep investing in new security systems in order to
prevent and fight the fraudsters, but the fraudsters don’t give up and keep trying to find new ways to
bypass those securities. This might results in new types of fraud besides the ones that the security
systems could prevent. It is safe to say that there is a everlasting fight between the carriers and
the fraudsters. The operators trying to avoid their systems from being attacked and the fraudsters
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Figure 2.1: Blue Box Device
trying to detect and abuse the weaknesses on the systems [3].
2.1.2 Fraud Methods
Telecommunications is wide area because it is composed by a variety of services like telephones
and internet. Fraud in this area is consequently an extensive subject. There are types of frauds
that are specific to one service, like the SIM card cloning fraud which is a fraud that can only be
committed in the mobile phone service. On the other hand, there are frauds that cover multiple
services like subscription fraud, which is associated to the subscription of services, non regarding
the type of service. Next, the fraud methods will be described.
• Superimposed Fraud — This kind of fraud happens when the fraudster gains unauthorized
access to a client account. In telecommunications, this includes the SIM card cloning fraud
that consists in the copy of the information inside the SIM card of the legitimate client to
another card in order to use it and access the carrier services. This mean that the fraudster
superimposes the client actions pretending to be that person. Despite not being so common
lately, it is the fraud who has been most reported in the since its detection. Thus, it has been
the object of more studies [8].
• Subscription Fraud — This fraud occurs when a client subscribes to a service (e.g. inter-
net) and uses it without the intention of paying. This is the fraud method that was reported
as the most frequent in the year of 2013 (see fig. 2.2) [3].
• Technical Fraud — This fraud occurs when a fraudster exploits the technical weaknesses
of a telecommunications system for his benefit. These weaknesses are usually discovered
by the fraudster in a trial and error methodology or by the direct guidance of an employee
who is committing internal fraud. Technical fraud in mostly common on newly deployed
services, where the chance of existing an error of development is bigger. Some of these
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Figure 2.2: 2013 WorldWide Telecommunications Fraud Methods Statistics.
errors are only fixed after the deployment of the system and in some cases after the fraud
being committed. This fraud includes the well known “system hacking” [3].
• Internal Fraud — Happens when an employee of a telecommunications company uses
internal information about the system in order to exploit it for personal benefit or the benefit
of others. This fraud is usually related with other types of fraud (e.g. technical fraud).
• Social Engineering — Instead of trying to discover the weaknesses of a carrier system
(like the trial and error system of technical fraud), the fraudster uses soft skills in order to
obtain detailed information about the system. This information can be obtained from the
employees of the carrier without them knowing the true intentions of the fraudster. There
might even exist a relation between this method and the internal fraud where the fraudster
convinces one employee in committing the fraud in his name [3].
Figure 2.2 displat the fraud methods with more incidences in the year 2013 worldwide.
2.2 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection, is one of the areas of the application of data mining which consists in the
identification of intances of data which do not fit the pattern defined by the data. An anomaly (or
outlier) is the instance of data that do not belong to any pattern predefined as normal or in fact
belong to a pattern consider abnormal [9]. In summary, the instances belonging to normal patterns
are considered normal and those who don’t belong are considered abnormal. If those patterns are
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Figure 2.3: Outliers example in a bidimensional data set.
well defined at an early stage and the model used to do the anomaly detection is well built, this
process can also be used in the prediction (prevention) of anomalies. Some example of anomaly
detection problems are:
• Fraud detection - telecommunications fraud, credit card fraud or insurances fraud.
• Intrusion Detection — network intrusion detection, live house security systems.
• Network Diagnoses — network monitoring, network debugging.
• Image Analyses — image processing.
• Failure Detection — networks failure prediction.
The process used to build an anomaly detection model is composed by two stages, the training
stage and the test stage. The first stage is the training stage and is used to build the model used for
detection. The second stage is the test stage and is used to evaluate the performance of the model
[10]. This process usually implies that the available data set is divided in to parts, one for training
and the other for testing. These parts usually represent 70% and 30% of the original data set for
training and testing respectively.
Anomaly detection wouldn’t be complicated by visual analysis for a small set of data. The
problem appears when the amount of data grows exponentially, and the visual analysis starts to be
less precise. In figure 2.3 we can observe two patterns of data in the group N1 e N2, one smaller
group O1 and an instance o1. In the case of anomaly detection, the instance o1 is undoubtedly an
outlier and the groups N1 e N2 are not outliers. However it can be argued that the smaller group
O1 can be either a group of outliers or just another group of normal data.
2.2.1 Anomaly Types
When building an anomaly detection system, it is necessary to specify the type of anomaly that
the system is able to detect [9]. These anomalies can be of type:
10 State Of the Art
• Point Anomalies — An individual instance that is considered abnormal relative to the rest
of the data. This is the most basic type of anomaly. In figure 2.3 the sample o1 is considered
a point anomaly. An example of a point anomaly in the telecommunications context is
when a client that has a mean call cost of value X and suddenly a call of value Y is made
(Y >> X). Then due to the difference from the mean, the call of cost Y is very likely to be
a point anomaly.
• Contextual Anomalies — A data instance that differs from the rest of the data given a
certain context (or scenario). The same instance can be classified as normal given a different
context. The context definition is defined when formalizing the data mining problem. An
example of contextual anomaly in the telecommunications context is when we compare the
number of calls made by a user within the business context against personal context. It
is more likely for a client to make less calls in the personal context than in the working
context. So, if an extraordinary large number of calls appears for that client, it will be
considered abnormal in the personal context and normal in the business context.
• Collective Anomalies — A group of related data that is considered anomalous according to
the rest of the data set. Individual instances in that group may not be considered anomalies
when compared to the rest of the data, but when joined together they are considered an
anomaly. An example of collective anomaly in the telecommunications context is when the
monitoring system that counts the number of active calls in the infrastructure per second is
displaying 0 active calls for a 1 minute period measure. This means that 60 measures were
made and all of them were returning 0. A minute without any active calls is very likely to
be considered an anomaly, but if we take each one of those 60 measures as a single case, or
even smaller groups, then they might be considered normal.
2.2.2 Data Mining
Data mining is a process that allows the extraction of non-explicit knowledge from a data set [11].
It consists in the semi-automatic analysis of the data, attempting to find patterns that summarize
the relevant information contained in it. This process is very useful for handling big amounts of
data, which is a characteristic of the data generated from the telecommunications companies. A
typical data mining problem starts from the need to find extra information from an existing set of
data. Each step in the process is measured in order to achieve the maximum amount of information
for the planned objective. The steps that compose the standard process are:
• Data cleaning and integration — Cleaning consist in the removal of noise and data that
are consider redundant and useless. In the integration phase, data from multiple sources is
combined.
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• Data Selection and Transformation — In the selection step, only the data that is relevant
for the task is selected. This data is prepared for the algorithm used in the data mining pro-
cess (next step). Transformation allows the creation of new data derived from the previous
data, such as new variables that are a combination of the original ones.
• Data Mining — This is the step where the new knowledge will be extracted from the data.
An algorithm is applied to the data in order to obtain a model that represents the data charac-
teristics. Some algorithms used in this step are described in the anomaly detection chapter.
• Evaluation — In this step the output of the data mining process (previous step) is evaluated.
The performance of the model is measured and the results are evaluated from the point of
view of the objective that was initially defined.
• Knowledge Presentation — Presentation of the results to the user. This presentation de-
pends of the desire output. It can be a visual presentation like data charts or a tables or it
can be another data set that can be used as the input for a new data mining process.
Despite presenting a well-defined order, it doesn’t necessarily mean that to achieve a good
result we are only required to execute only once each one of these steps. In most cases a good
result only appear after a few iterations of the whole process [12].
2.2.3 Learning Types
When building a model for an anomaly detection process, it is required to know if the data that
is being used in the algorithm to construct the model contains examples that are labeled. In other
words, if the value of the objective variable is known [9]. The objective variable is the variable
that, in the case of anomaly detection data mining, says to which class a given data instance belong
to, normal or anomalous. This is also known as the label. The learning type differs regarding the
labelling of the input data. The existent learning types are:
• Supervised — The data used to construct the model has labels indicating whether examples
are normal or abnormal. This type of learning is very useful for prediction models because
it contains information about both classes.
• Semi-Supervised — The data used to construct the model contains both labelled and unla-
belled examples. Models using this type of learning usually try to define the labelled class
properties. Any instances that doesn’t fit in those properties is label in the opposite class.
• Unsupervised — The data available is not labelled. One example of this type of learning is
clustering, which groups the examples in the data according to their similarity.
Sometimes the labelling process is made by hand of an analyst. This is a tiring job and due to
this, sometimes the amount of labelled data is very tiny. In some cases there might be bad labelling
of the data [13].
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2.2.4 Model Evaluation
One of the most important steps when building an anomaly detection model, is evaluating its
performance. In the case of anomaly detection, this process consists in extracting indicators which
allow to compare one model detection output with te original data. The models output can be of
two types:
• Labels — for each instance of data, the models outputs a positive or negative label (anoma-
lous or normal).
• Scores — for each instance of data the model outputs a value, created by a scoring tech-
nique, that represents the degree of anomaly also known as anomaly score. This allows the
results to be ranked and give priority anomalies with higher scores. It is also possible to
convert an output score into a label by using a threshold.
2.2.4.1 Evaluation Metrics
In anomaly detection, each data instance data can only belong to one of two classes: positive
or negative class. The anomolous data is usually represented by the positive class because the
objective of the detection process is detect anomolous data. Therefore, the negative class data is
the normal data. This notion allows to usage several indicator to evaluate the performance of a
given model. Comparing the models output class labels with the original labels 4 indicators can
be obtained:
• True Positives (TP) — Amount of positive class instances classified as positive (anomalous
instance labelled as anomalous);
• True Negatives (TN) — Amount of negative class instances classified as negative (normal
instance labelled as normal);
• False Positives (FP)— Amount of negative class instances classified as positive (normal
instance labelled as anomalous);
• False Negatives (FN)— Amount of positive class instances classified as negative (anoma-
lous instance labelled as normal);
This allows the calculation of more descriptive measures like the recall and precision, which
are the most popular performance indicators for binary classification. Recall is the fraction of
the original positive class instances that were classified as positive. Precision is the fraction of
predicted positive class instancess that were correctly classified.
precision =
T P
T P+FP
(2.1)
recall =
T P
T P+FN
(2.2)
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Figure 2.4: 2 models ROC curve Comparison
2.2.4.2 ROC
Another interesting approach to describe the model performance is the ROC curve. To plot a ROC
curve it is required for the model to output a probability or a ranking of the examples in terms of
some scoring function relative to the positive class [12]. This ranking, or probability, describes
how likely it is for an instance to belong to the positive class. This curve plots the relation between
the True Positive Rate (TPR), or recall, and the False Positive Rate (FPR) when the boundary
of decision changes. The boundary of decision is the threshold used to transform the ranking or
probability into a class label. The method to draw the curve is then to make the decision boundary
to go from the minimum value to the maximum value int the scoring function, and in each step
measure the TPR and FPR.
truepositiverate =
T P
P
=
T P
T P+FN
= recall (2.3)
f alsepositiverate =
FP
N
=
FP
T N +FP
(2.4)
Figure 2.4 displays the comparison between two ROC curves. Both curves are drawn above
the dotted line (X = Y ) which means that the TPR is always bigger than the FPR for every value
of the decision boundary. This also means that they are both good models to classify the data.
This ROC comparison also displays the perfect model which is represented by the curve ROC1.
In the perfect model, all the positive instances have are selected by the model before any negative
instance is incorrectly selected.
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2.2.4.3 Model Validation
Model validation techniques focus on repeating the model construction and validation stages in
different testing and training data and in each experiment, to improve the reliability of the esti-
mated values of the performance measures. There are several methods to make the selection of
the data used in the train and test stages like the holdout method, k-fold cross-validation, boot-
strap and the Monte Carlo experiment. Here, we only describe two of these methods: the k-fold
cross-validation and the Monte Carlo experiment.
In the k-fold cross-validation method, the data set is randomly divided into k subsets of the
same size with similar initial characteristics (e.g. same class distribution as the original data set).
These subsets are also known as folds. At each interaction, nine folds are used for training and,
the remaining fold is used for testing. The same fold is never used for training and testing at the
same time. The method ends when every fold was used for testing [12]. When k is equal to the
size of the data set N, this method is called "leave-one-out" cross-validation.
In the montecarlo experiment, the original data set is partitioned M times into disjoint training
and testing subsets. The training and testing data sets are fractions of size nt and nv, respectively,
of the original data set. The main feature of this validation method is that, despite the training and
testing data sets being randomly generated, they respect the temporal order of the data. Therefore
the training data set is generated from randomly selecting data that is on an earlier time interval
than the data used for the generation of the testing data set. This method is especially important
for validating time series forecasting models [14].
2.3 Data Mining Techniques for Anomaly Detection
In this section, some of the existing techniques that use data mining processes for anomaly detec-
tion will be presented.
2.3.1 Clustering based techniques
Clustering is a process that has the objective of partitioning the data into subgroups of instances
that have similar characteristics. These groups are called clusters. Anomaly detection using clus-
ters is made by applying a clustering algorithm to the data and afterwards, the classification of the
data is made by one of the following principles:
• Normal data instances belong to a cluster and abnormal instances don’t — In this case
the clustering algorithm shouldn’t force every instance to belong to a cluster.
• Normal data instances are closer to the centroid of the corresponding cluster and ab-
normal instances are far from it — The cluster centroid is the graphical centre of the
cluster.
• Normal data instances belong to denser clusters and abnormal instances are in less
denser clusters — In this case it is requires to measure the density of each cluster of data.
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To define the density value where a cluster belongs to each one of the classes it is required
to define a threshold values;
These techniques don’t require the data to be labelled, therefore they are of the type unsu-
pervised learning. They also work with several types of data. Although the anomaly detection
is fast and simple after the cluster have been achieved, the clustering process may be slow and
computational expensive. The performance of the anomaly detection process depends mostly on
the clustering process [9].
2.3.2 Nearest neighbour based techniques
Nearest neighbours techniques are based on measures of the distance (or similarity) between data
instances. The distance calculation is made by a relation between the attributes of the data in both
instances. Anomaly detection approaches based on nearest neighbour can be of two types:
• Kth nearest neighbour techniques — This techniques starts by giving each data instance
an anomaly score that is obtained by evaluation of the distance to its kth neighbours. Af-
terwards the most usual way to separate anomalous instances from normal instances is by
applying a threshold to the anomaly scores calculated previously.
• Relative density techniques — In this technique each instance is evaluated by measuring
the density of its neighbourhood. The neighbourhood density is measured by the amount
of instances that are within a distance range that is previously defined. It is expected for
anomalous data instances to have less dense neighbourhoods and normal data instances to
have more dense neighbourhoods.
These techniques can use unsupervised learning, which makes the model construction only
guided by the rest of the data features non regarding the class label. In this case, if the normal
instances don’t have enough neighbours and the anomalous instances do, the model will fail to
correctly label the anomalous instances. Since the key aspect of this technique is the distance
function, it allows the adaption of the model to other type of data only requiring to change the
way the distance is calculated. This is also the main downside, because bad distances calculation
methods will result in poor performance [9].
2.3.3 Statistical Techniques
In statistics techniques the anomaly detection is done by evaluating the statistical probability of
a given instance to be anomalous. Therefore the first step in these techniques is the construction
of a statistical model, usually for normal behaviour, that fits the given data. The probability of an
instance to be anomalous is then derived from the model. In the case that the model represents the
probability of normal behaviour, when a data instance is evaluated in the model, the ones that are
assigned high probability are considered normal and the ones with low probability are considered
anomalous. The probability construction models can be of the type:
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• Parametric — Statistical models of this type assume its probabilistic distribution is defined
a priori, and parameters which are derived from the given data. An example of a parametric
probability distribution is the Gaussian distribution that is defined by parameters of mean
(µ) and standard deviation (σ ).
• Non-parametric — These models are entirely based on the data without having a probabil-
ity distribution fixed beforehand. An example of model of this type are the histogram based
models, in which the histogram is built using the given data.
These techniques outputs scores associated with a confidence interval. The downside of para-
metric technique is that works under the assumption that the probabilities are distributed under a
specific way which is not true in most cases [9].
2.3.4 Classification Techniques
Anomaly detection using classification techniques requires the construction of a classifier. A
classifier is a model constructed under supervised, or semi-supervised, learning algorithm. It
represents patterns in the datathat can later be used to classify new data instances as normal or
anomalous. There are several classification techniques. The main difference between them are the
classifier type (model) that each one builds and use. Some of these approaches are:
• Neural Networks — In this approach during the training stage, a neural network is trained
with data from the normal class allowing the model to capture the normal data characteris-
tics. Afterwards, data instances are used as input of the network. If the network accepts that
instance then it will be classified as normal, if not it will be classified as anomalous.
• Bayes networks — In this approach the training stage is used to obtain the prior probabili-
ties for the atributes of the data and class distribution in each class. In the testing stage, the
classification is made by calculating the posterior probability (the Bayes theorem) of every
class in each data instance. The class with higher probability for that instance, represents
the class which that instance is going to be labelled with.
• SVM — In this approach the training stage is used to delimit the region (boundary) where
data is classified as normal. In the testing stage, the instances are compared to that region,
if they fall in the delimited region they are classified as normal, if not, as anomalous.
• Rules – In this approach, the training stage is used to create a group of rules (e.g. if-else
conditions) that characterize the normal behaviour of the data. In the testing stage, every
instance is evaluated with those rules, if they pass every condition they are classified as
normal, if not, as anomalous.
These techniques use very powerful and flexible algorithms, because it is only required to
apply the classifier to each instance. The downside is that supervised learning requires a very ef-
fective labelling processs. If any mistakes were made, they will later result in a worse performance
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of the classifier. The output of this technique is in most of the cases a class label, which his not
suitable for scoring [9].
2.3.5 Classification with Unbalanced Datasets
An unbalanced data set is a data set where the number of examples of the existing classes is not
balanced. This means that the amount of instances belonging to one of the classes is much more
abundant than the other(s). In the case of anomaly detection, it is quite usual for the amount
of anomaly instances to be quite smaller than the amount of normal ones. This is a problem
because it will make the anomaly detection algorithm to identify easily patterns regarding the
normal data but not for the anomalies. A solution to counter this problem is to change the model
construction process in order to generate conditions to deal with the unbalanced classes. However
this solution is not one of the most common because it requires greater research and changes on the
standard model construction algorithm, instead of using off-the-shelf algorithm [15]. Therefore
some optional solutions that use off-the-shelf algorithms are:
• Undersample the major class — before constructing the model, remove some instances of
the major class (with sampling techniques). This might result in the decrease of information
for the undersample class data in the resulting model.
• Oversample the minor class — before constructing the model, repeat some minor class
data instances. This will result in some repetitive information being used in the model
construction algorithm.
Some additional solutions are based on feature engineering in order to enable the algorithm to
find patterns concerning the minority class [16].
2.4 Data Mining on Fraud Detection
Most works on data mining done in telecommunications fraud detection have the objective of de-
tecting or preventing the methods of superimposed fraud [8, 13] and subscription, [1, 17] because
these are the fraud types that have done more damage to the telecommunications industry.
2.4.1 Data Format
Projects done in fraud telecommunications aren’t always easy to begin, because companies can’t
allow direct access to data of their clients, due to agreements between carrier and the clients. The
type of data that is most commonly avaiable to researchers are the CDR, call details records (or
call data records)[6, 2, 1, 5, 13, 17, 18]. These records have a log like format and they are created
every time the client finishes using a service of the operator. The format of the records may change
from company to company but the most common attributes are:
• Caller and called Identification Number;
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• Date and time;
• Type of Service (Voice Call, SMS, etc...) ;
• Duration;
• Network access point identifiers;
• Others;
This data doesn’t actually compromise the identification of the users or the content that was
traded in the communication, therefore it doesn’t violate any privacy agreement. If some logs
do compromise the true identification of the clients, the data can be anonymized by the company
before being released.
2.4.2 User Profiling
In most fraud detection studies, the authors choose techniques of user profiling in order to describe
the behaviour of the users [19, 6, 5, 2]. User profiling is done by separating the data that has
anything to do with a user and develop a model that represent its behaviour. This enables the
extraction of additional information from the data used, and even add some additional information
to the data set, like new attributes, before doing the model for anomaly detection.
The user models can be optimized by dynamically adapting user profiles [8]. This means that
the user model must be updated every time the user makes an interaction with the system. Users
don’t have a constant behaviour so the models that define their behaviour should not be static.
Profiling requires a lot of information about the users in order to build the most representative
behaviour model. CDRs are very useful to create behaviour models. However to make a more
realistic representation of the user, more information is required, which is rather difficult to obtain
due to confidentiality agreements.
2.4.3 Rule based applications
T. Fawcett and F. Provost [8], presented a method for superimposed fraud detection based on rules.
They used a group of adaptive rules to obtain indicators of fraudulent behaviour from the data.
These indicators were used for the construction of monitors. These monitors defined fraudulent
behaviour profiles and are used as input for the analysis model, also known as detector [19]. The
detector combines the output of the monitors with the data generated along the day by a user, and
in the case of fraudulent activity, outputs an alarm.
S. Augustin, C. Gaiber, J. Knauer, M. Massoth, K. Piejko, D. Rihm and T. Wiens developed
a system for fraud detection in new generation networks[18] . The system is composed by two
modules: one for interpretation of data and other for detection of fraud. In the module of interpre-
tation, the CDR’s data is used as an input, and the module analyzes and convert that data into CDR
objects, which will be used to as input for the classification module. In the classification model,
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the CDR objects will be subject to a series of filter analysis. The filters are actually rule based
classification models that were obtained previously from real fraudulent data. If a CDR object
doesn’t respect the rules in those filters an alarm is generated. As a result rate of false-positive 4%.
2.4.4 Neural networks Applications
In the system for fraud detection built by the M. Taniguchi, M, Haft, J, Hollmén and V. Tresp [20],
three anomaly detection techniques are used: supervised learning neural networks, parametric
statistcal techniques and Bayesian networks. The supervised neural network is used to construct
a discriminative function between the fraud and normal classes using only summary statistics. In
the parametric statistical technique, the density estimation is generated using a Gaussian mixture
model, and it is used to model the past behaviour of every user in order to detect any abnormal
change from the past behaviour. The Bayesian networks are used to define the probabilistic models
of a particular user and different fraud scenarios, enabling the detection of fraud given a user’s
behaviour. In the tests done by the authors, the system had a precision of 100% and a recall of
85%.
2.4.5 Other Applications
The system developed by H. Farvaresh and Mohammad M.Sepehri [17] for subscription fraud
was composed by 3 stages: pre-processing, clustering and classification. In the pre-processing
stage, the raw data was cleaned, prepared and the transformed using principal components anal-
ysis (PCA). In the clustering stage, the data was clustered into homogeneous clusters by the two
clustering algorithms SOM and k-means. If the resulting clusters are very specific, very different
from other clusters or outlier clusters (one instance cluster), then they are discarded and they are
not used in the classification stage. This stage was also used to insert some new features to the
data in order to keep the properties of clusters generated previously. In the last stage, the classifi-
cation stage, the instances are classified using the classifiers SVM, neural networks and decision
trees. The classifitaion is made over different ensembles: bagging, boosting, stacking, voting and
standard. The result final result is obtained by the ensemble that offered the best performance.
A very interesting work was done by Kenneth C. Cox, Stephen G. Eick and Graham J. Will
[21]. They experimented visual techniques data mining in order to detect anomalies. They claim
that these techniques offer one great advantage over learning algorithms, because the systems for
the human visualization have better dynamism and adaptability therefore they are better able to
cope with the evolution on fraudulent behaviour. These methodology is based in the quality of the
graphical presentation of the data on human visual interfaces in order to facilitate the visual fraud
detection.
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Chapter 3
Naive Bayes
3.1 Algorithm
Naive Bayes is a supervised learning classification algorithm that applies the Bayes’s theorem with
an assumption of independence between the data features [22]. This assumption is what make him
naive. The Bayes’s theorem in the classification scenario can be described as
P(θ | x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) =
P(θ)P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn | θ)
P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn)
(3.1)
where x1,x2,x3, ...,xn = X is the data instance (group of features of that instance), θ is the
class (positive or negative), P(θ | x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) is the posterior probability or the probability
of a given instance X to belong to the class θ , P(θ) is the prior class probability distribution,
P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn | θ) is the prior attribute probability given the class θ , and P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) is
the evidence or instance probability.
The Naive characteristic of this algorithm is visible on the numerator. Before applying the
independence property, the numerator can be re-written using the conditional chain rule:
P(θ)P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn | θ) = P(θ)P(x1 | θ)P(x2,x3, ...,xn | θ ,x1)
= P(θ)P(x1 | θ)P(x2 | θ ,x1)P(x3, ...,xn | θ ,x1,x2)
(3.2)
After all the features have been separated, the independence between features property can be
applied and the equation can be summarized as:
P(θ)P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn | θ) = P(θ)P(x1 | θ)P(x2 | θ)P(x3 | θ)...P(xn | θ)
= P(θ)
n
∏
i=1
P(xi | θ)
(3.3)
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Prior attribute probabilities are calculated by the following equation:
P(xt | θ) =
Nt,xt ,θ
∑ j∈t Nt, j,θ
(3.4)
where Nt,xt ,θ is the amount of instances with attribute t of value xt belonging to class θ [23].
The denominator (P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn)), is constant in each instance (x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) and results
from the sum of the numerator value for all possible classes.
P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) =
m
∑
j=1
{P(θ j)
n
∏
i=1
P(xi | θ j)} (3.5)
Finally, the initial Naive Bayes equation, can be re-written as
P(θ | x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) =
P(θ)∏n1 P(xi | θ)
m
∑
j=1
{P(θ j)
n
∏
i=1
P(xi | θ j))}
(3.6)
3.1.1 Naive Bayes for Classification
If the objective of the Naive Bayes algorithm is to simply classify instances with a label with-
out regard for the class probability (or ranking) for each instance, then the classification process
doesn’t require the value of the denominator (P(x1,x2,x3, ...,xn)) since it is a constant for each in-
stance. The classification process only requires the result of the numerator, P(θ)∏n1 P(xi | θ). This
characteristic allows the use of Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) value to estimate the values P(θ)
and ∏n1 P(xi | θ) to determine which class θpred does a given instance (x1,x2,x3, ...,xn) achieves its
maximum value [22]. The resulting classification rule is
θpred = argmaxθP(θ)
n
∏
i=1
P(xi | θ) (3.7)
3.1.2 LaPlace Correction
When constructing the Naive Bayes model, namely calculating the class prior probability (P(θ)),
there might be some cases where the data does not offer the necessary information regarding a
given feature (xt) for a value (A) in one of the classes (θr), resulting in a prior attribute probability
of value zero. This will later result in a posterior probability for an instance with feature xt = A
to be zero for the class θr. This results in a model that will never classify an instance with that
particular characteristic (xt = A) as belonging to the class θr even if the rest of the features strongly
point for that instance to belong θr. To avoid this effect, it is usual to use a method called Laplace
Correction in order to avoid absense of information in the data regarding one of the classes. This
method changes the initial value of the count for instances with that characteristic in a given class
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[24]. The formula for a the prior attribute probability calculation for a given attribute xt on a given
class θ is
P(xt | θ) =
I +Nt,xt ,θ
(K ∗ I)+∑ j∈t Nt,i,θ
(3.8)
where I is the Laplace Correction value (usually 1) and K is the different values that attribute
xt can have.
3.1.3 Continuous Variables
Some attributes in the data set might have continues values, this will cause a problem in the
likelihood probabilities because it is rather impossible to cover all the values in an interval of
continuous values. In order to describe these variables there are some procedures that can be made
in order to summarize them. One option is to discretize the variable. In this case the continuous
variable will be converted to discrete values (e.g. convert continuous intervals to discrete variables)
thus becoming compatible with the standard model construction method. Other common option to
describe the continuous variables is by making the assumption that the variable values are follow
a parametric probability distribution. This requires some intrinsic adaptions of the Naive Bayes
model in order to calculate the likelihood probability using the density distribution function. A
popular solution is to use a Gaussian-like distribution. In this case, during training it is only
required to calculate the mean (µθ ) and standard deviation (σθ ) for the feature xt in each class θ
[25]. During model construction, the prior atribute probability is given by:
P(xt | θ) = 1σθ
√
2pi
e−(xt−µθ )
2
/
2σ2θ (3.9)
3.2 Previous adaptations
A previously study presents a correction to the prior attribute probabilities calculation to counter
the unbalanced classes effect on the final model [24]. This solution was studied on the application
on the Naive Bayes algorithm with objective of text classification. It can actually be applied as
a normalization step to the data, enabling the possibility of leaving the Naive Bayes as a off-the-
shelf algorithm. In this particular solution, due to the data structure, the prior attribute probability
is calculated by the following equation (using the authors notation):
P(w | c) = 1+∑d∈Dc nwd
k+∑w′∑d∈DC nw′d
(3.10)
where nwd is the number of times that word w appear on document d, Dc is the collection of all
documents belonging to class c and K is the previous explained LaPlace Correction. The objective
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of this author is to normalize the word count in each class in so that the size for each class is the
same. To achieve this, the variable nwd is transformed as:
α
nwd
∑w′∑d∈DC nw′d
(3.11)
where α is the normalization constant and defines the amount of smoothing across word counts
in the dictionary. When α = 1 the resulting equation is:
P(w | c) =
1+ ∑d∈Dc nwd∑w′ ∑d∈DC nw′d
k+1
(3.12)
This allows to scale the prior attribute probability in the case of the objective class (or classes)
in order boost the posterior probability calculation for word with those characteristics.
3.3 Proposal
This project proposes the study of two solutions for the anomaly detection system using the Naive
Bayes classification algorithm. These proposal are intent to compensate the effect that unbalanced
class data generates when constructing the the classification model, and therefore the classification.
For comparison purposes, the standard procedure in the classification task is represented in
figure 3.1
3.3.1 Naive Class Distribution
This solution consists mainly in changing the properties of the model generated by the Naive Bayes
algorithm, more precisely the prior class probability ((P(θ))) of the model. This approach is the
result of analysis of the effect of undersampling the data in the major class before constructing
the model. Undersampling the data before applying the Naive Bayes algorithm can result in a
better class distribution, which affects the prior class probability ((P(θ)))) of the Naive Bayes
model. However, it can degrade que information in the prior attribute probability ((P(θ | X)))
of the model, which is the result of removing intances by undersampling data. This process on
the other hand is meant to balanced the class probability, and therefore the prior class probability
without compromising the prior atribute probability. The assumption made in this solution was:
condition the prior class probability without compromising the prior attribute probability, so that
the class distribution do not affect the classification. In order to produce this change, the model
construction process must have a variable which describes the prior class distribution. In this case
the variable used is the Prior Percentage Distribution (PPD). (PPD) is the value to be assigned to
the negative class prior probability (P(θN)). Therefore it is also possible to extract the value of the
positive class prior probability (P(θP)). The method is specified as:
P(θN) = PPD (3.13)
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Figure 3.1: Standard Naive Bayes model construction squematics
P(θP) = 1−PPD = 1−P(θN) (3.14)
An representative illustration of the process is presented on figure 3.2.
Comparing to the standard procedure, the main diference is on the training of the model which
included Change Prior Probabilities module on the training stage. This module changes the values
of the prior class probability (P(θ)) according to the previously set Prior Percentage Distribution
value (PPD).
3.3.2 Naive Bayes Margin
This proposal consists on creating additional features to the model generated by the standard al-
gorithm. The margin values, mn and mp, are the key aspect of this proposal and they are built
upon the following assumption: How can the negative class (major) posterior probability be re-
duced and the positive class (minor) posterior probability be increased in order to get more True
Positives without compromising the True Negatives. This solution has a similiar characteristics to
the method in the SVM classification algorithm, where the margin is the distance to the decision
boundary. The procedure, is then to study the posterior probabilities for the True Negatives and
False Negatives instances in the classified train data (classified by the model constructed using
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Figure 3.2: Naive Class Distribution model construction squematics
that same train data) in order to achieve two values that can be applied to the probabilities for both
classes in order to obtain better Positive Classification. The process used to generate the margin
values (mn and mp) is:
mn =
∑i∈TrueNegatives(Pt(θN | i)−0.5)
T N
(3.15)
mp =
∑i∈FalseNegatives(Pt(θP | i)−0.5)
FN
(3.16)
where Pt(θN | i) is the posterior probability of instance i to belong to the negative class (θN),
T N is the amount of True Negatives, Pt(θP | i) is the posterior probability of instance i to belong
to the positive class (θP) and FN is the amount of False Negatives. Note that this process occurs
during the training stage, therefore these are posterior probabilities for the train data. Also note
that mn, that is the margin value generated from the true negative probabilities, is a positive value
while mp, that is the margin value generated from the false negative probabilities, is a negative
value.
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The generated margin values are then applied to the process after the classification process.
The application method is represented in the equation:
Pm(θN | X) =

Pp(θN |X)−mn
(Pp(θP|i)−mp)+(Pp(θN |X)−mn) (Pp(θN | X)−mn)> 0
0 (Pp(θN | X)−mn)< 0
(3.17)
Pm(θP | X) =

Pp(θP|X)−mp
(Pp(θP|X)−mp)+(Pp(θN |X)−mn) (Pp(θN | X)−mn)> 0
1 (Pp(θN | X)−mn)< 0
(3.18)
where the Pp(θP,X) and Pp(θN ,X) are the posterior probabilities generated by classification
process with the naive bayes model and Pm(θP,X) and Pm(θN ,X) are the new posterior probabili-
ties after applying the margin to the predictions, both cases for intances X = {x1,x2, ...,xn}. Note
that the denominator is only a normalization process that is applied so that posterior probabilities
keep the property of Pm(θP,X) = 1−Pm(θN ,X).
The process for the model construction and the new features generation are represented in
figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Naive Bayes Margin model construction squematics
The main differences for this process with the standard procedure are:
• Train — Instead of simply using the training stage to construct the Naive Bayes model,
after the construction the resulting model will be used to classify (Predictor in the train area
of figure 3.3) the same data that is used for its construction (train data). The output of that
classification process is in the form of posterior probabilities (Pt(θ | X)). In this case, the
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probabilities for an instance to belong to the positive class (Pt(θP | X)) or the negative class
(Pt(θN | X)). Afterwards, the train data and the associated posterior probabilities will feed
the margin estimator. The margin estimator is going to derive two new values (mn and mp)
from that train data and correspondent classification, that will be used in future predictions.
These values are denominated as margin values.
• Test — In the testing stage, the model without the new features is going to be used for
the prediction as the typical classification process would do. The output of the prediction
process (Pp(θ | X)) also needs to be in the form of class probabilities (like the predictor in
the training stage). Instead of using these probabilities to label the test data and finish the
process by evaluating the results, the posterior probabilities will feed, together with the pre-
vious calculated margin values into the apply margin module. In this module, the posterior
probabilities generated by the model (Pp(θ | X)) are re-calculated using the designed algo-
rithm and the previously calculated margin values. This process will results in new posterior
probabilites (Pm(θ | X)) that will be used to label the data.
Results of this proposals will be presented in the results section further in this document.
Chapter 4
Prediction of Telecom Anomalies
4.1 Data Understanding
The data set used for this project is composed by two days of CDR (Call Details Records) from a
telecom company that must remain anonymous for confidentiality reasons. Each data set has the
following features (or attributes):
• DATE — date in which the record was created. It is in the format "YYYYMMDD",
"YYYY" year, "MM" month and "DD" days. This parameter has only two different val-
ues in all examples of the data set used, because there are only two different days.
• TIME — time in which the record was created. It is in the format "hhmmss", "hh" hours,
"mm" minutes and "ss" seconds.
• DURATION — is the amount of time, in seconds, that the service lasted.
• MSISDN — anonymized cellphone number of user1.
• OTHER_MSISDN — anonymized cellphone number of user2.
• CONTRACT_ID — contract indentification number of user1.
• OTHER_CONTRACT_ID — contract indentification number of user2.
• START_CELL_ID — cell identification number for the cell (antenna) where the caller user
is accessing.
• END_CELL_ID — cell identification number for the cell (antenna) where the called user
is accessing.
• DIRECTION — describes the direction of the call. It can take two values: "I" for inbound
and "O" for outbound. This atribute describes the user - Caller/Called. If the value is
"I"(inbound) then user1 is the caller and user2 is the called user.
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• CALL_TYPE — identifier of the type of the call, or service, which the record corresponds
to. It can take the following values: "MO", "ON", "FI", "SV" and "OT". A precise descrip-
tion of what those values mean was not provided.
• DESTINATION — describes the territorial of the call. It can take two values: "I" for
international calls and "L" for local calls.
• VOICEMAIL — a flag-like varialble that takes the value "Y" for calls who went to voice-
mail and "N" for calls who are not
• DROPPED_CALL — target variable for the anomaly detection system, or Class. It is a
flag-like feature that take two values: "Y" for a dropped call (Positive Class) and "N" for a
successful call (Negative Class).
An exploratory data analysis was carried out by computing basic statistics and visualizing the
data. Several interesting observations were made, including:
• Cells identifiers, START_CELL_ID and END_CELL_ID, are not available in every in-
stance. There isn’t a relation in the call characteristics that justifies the missing value be-
cause, in some cases, for calls with the same characteristics there are missing values in both
IDs or only one ID or even none of them is missing. This effect could relate to calls which
the users are accessing the networks trough cells who don’t belong to the carrier infrastruc-
ture, therefore they can’t be identified.
• The contract identifier of user2, OTHER_CONTRACT_ID, in most of the cases is not
filled in. This could also relate with the cells identifiers effect explained previously, but in
this case it is not the infrastructure that belongs to another carrier but the client.
• All international calls (calls with DESTINATION equal to "I") have the CALL_TYPE
feature always equal to "OT", while in the local calls the CALL_TYPE feature can take
values of "MO", "ON", "FI" and "SV";
• All calls who went to voicemail (VOICEMAIL have the value "Y") have the CALL_TYPE
feature equal to "SV" and all have the same OTHER_MSISDN number. This might corre-
spond to the anonymized number of the voicemail center;
There are some important characteristics about this data that can be displayed through some
simple statistics. The total amount of records used for this project is of 14,043,142 for the day1
data set and 13,888,323 for the day2 data set. The class distribution is visibly unbalanced (figure
4.1) where Day1 has about 2.87% dropped calls and Day2 about 2.95%.
There are some important characteristics about this data that are required to be presented be-
cause they associate the present data with data that can actually be generated by a true telecommu-
nications carrier in a real-world scenario. The first characteristic is presented in figure 4.2 in which
the amount of calls that are made per hour during each of the days are displayed. It is possible
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to see that the amount of calls that are done in the day time (8am to 9pm) is much larger than
the amount of calls done during the night time (10pm to 7am) which is the expected distribution.
Another interesting aspect is shown in figures 4.3 and 4.3. These figures, represent the amount of
calls done by duration in each of the two days. In this case, it is possible to observe that most of
the calls are of short duration (< 100 seconds) which is very typical on a real-world scenario. The
call duration presented in figures 4.3 and 4.4 exclude some outlier calls with duration > 5000 sec-
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Figure 4.4: Number of calls by duration in day 2
onds. One important property that can be obtained from this figures that is going to help the model
construction is that, the call duration presents a Gaussian-like distribution (see section 3.1.3).
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4.2 Data Preparation
In attempt to obtain more information concerning the target variable, some extra features were
generated and added to the data. These features objective is to include more information about the
relation between the call properties and the cell and user which the call belongs to. The features
format is designed to be compatible with the naive bayes algorithm. In brief, this feature generation
process starts by building a characterization of the cells and users with data up to a certain time t.
These characteristics are then appended to the variables that describe calls with date t+1. These
new features are also designated as signatures, because they add to the data, information regarding
the characteristics of the users and cells involved in each particular call.
The process for this signature generation is composed by two essential stages:
• Data Analysis and Signature Database Generation — In this stage the data set is pro-
cessed in order to group data by cell and user id. Afterwards, statistics are made regarding
the number of occurrences in the other features (e.g. DROPPED_CALLS, DESTINATION).
These statistics are very straightforward and simple , such as the number of successful inter-
national calls in cell with ID J when this is the start cell or number of dropped inbound calls
in cell with ID J when this is the end cell. To take into account the differences in behavior
of the users at different times of the day, intervals were made in order to group data (e.g.
TIME was grouped in 8 hour intervals (0-7, 8-15, 16-23)).
• Signature Generation — In this stage the data instances are extended with the correspond-
ing signature features. In each instance the cells and user ids are used to access the informa-
tion generated and stored in the previous stage. This information is then combined with the
call instance properties to generate the new features.
For each cell and user id, two new features are generated. The first describes the association
of the call properties with the cell (or user) normal characteristics (i.e. the characteristics associ-
ated with calls from the Negative Class) and other that describes the association of the same call
properties with the cell or user abnormal characteristics (Positive Class).
The main operator used in the generation of the features is the relation between the attributes
in the call and the data regarding the class and the cell (or user) identifier. The operator Pj(Xi | θP)
and Pj(Xi | θN), is defined as the probability for a given instance Xi to belong to the positive θP
or negative θN class in a user or cell with id j. This properties are very similar to prior attribute
probabilities in the Naive Bayes algorithm, the main difference is that the data used to generate
the probabilities belongs to a specific user or cell.
In the first approach, the feature calculation was based in a independence relation between the
main operators in all features. Similar to the independence between features present in the Naive
Bayes algorithm. The calculation method for the Negative Signature is:
NegativeSignature1 =
n
∏
i=1
Pj(Xi | θN) (4.1)
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And the Positive Signature equation is
PositiveSignature1 =
n
∏
i=1
Pj(Xi | θP) (4.2)
The second approach result in some side effects that were detected in the first approach. The
previous method used the multiplication between attributes, which might result in the low prob-
ability attributes to affect the high probability of the others. To counter this effect, the second
approach sums all the attributes probabilities. Therefore the low probabilities attributes will not
affect the final signature value in such a severe manner. The second approach for the Negative
Signature equation is:
NegativeSignature2 =
n
∑
i=1
Pj(Xi | θN) (4.3)
And the Positive Signature equation is:
PositiveSignature2 =
n
∑
i=1
Pj(Xi | θP) (4.4)
The objective of building two features like this, it to give each call an additional characteristic
that allows an easier association with normal or abnormal properties. Another important aspect
about this features is that when they are included in the data, the atribute cell or user id that is used
to make the relation between the call and the cell, or user, is removed from the data, because they
do not have any discriminating power in the Naive Bayes algorithm. In total there are 6 features
that are added when the signature is generated. One pair for the start cell id, other for the end
cell id and other for contract id. However, in the case of the other contract id there is no signature
generated because most of the instances do not have any information regarding the other cell id.
4.3 Methodology
Given that the data used in this project is a stream of calls, it was necessary to construct a testing
environment that would behave like the real world application. Therefore, the use of the data
to construct the models and then too validate them, had to take into consideration the temporal
ordering of the instances. In other words, model and signatures were generated from older data
than the data they are used to classify. This rule was followed when training and testing the models,
therefore a monte-carlo experimentation routine was used in order to get the training and testing
data ordered in temporal order.
Figure 4.5 shows the simulated call classification process. This is achieved by previously
training the model and generating the database signatures so that it is only required to apply the
signature and classify each call individually. Each call is inserted in this simulation by the Call
Arrival input with the temporal order defined by the call timestamp. The insert signature module
is meant to add the signature features to the call as explained in section 4.2. This module has 3
possible configurations: include signature of type 1 (first approach), include signature of type 2
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Figure 4.5: Call Classification Simulation Process
(second approach) or don’t insert any signature. The signature database is constructed using the
methods explained in section 4.2 with a data set containing a full day of past records (day1 of
section 4.1), therefore respecting the temporal order rule that was established in the earlier. The
classification process module uses the previously generated and stored model to classify the data.
This allowed to test 4 types of model constructions which are named as: Normal Naive Bayes,
Undersampled Naive bayes, Prior Naive Bayes and Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes.
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Figure 4.6: Normal Naive Bayes Model
The Normal Naive Bayes process, shown on figure 4.6, is the normal Naive Bayes model
construction process where the model is obtained simply by applying the traditional Naive Bayes
algorithm to the training data.
The Undersampled Naive Bayes process is shown on figure 4.7. The training set used for
this model construction is obtained by undersampling the negative class (major class) instances
according to a pre-defined percentage, without changing the amount of positive class instances.
The model is obtained by applying the traditional Naive Bayes to the resulting undersampled data.
The undersampling rate parameter defines the amount of negative class instances that are going
to be sampled from the complete dataset. For instance, an undersampling rate of 20% in 10,000
negative class instances will result in a 2.000 random sample of those negative class instances.This
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Figure 4.9: Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes Model (Naive Bayes Margin proposal)
undersample process outputs the data in the correct time order therefore respecting the previously
defined rule.
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The Prior Naive Bayes process, shown on figure 4.8, is represents the Naive Class Distribution
proposal. It starts by using the training data to construct the model as the Normal Naive Bayes
process would. After the model is constructed, it changes the prior class probability in the model
with the prior probability distribution parameter given. For instance,a prior probability percentage
of 20% will result in a positive prior class distribution of 0.2 (P(θN) = 0.2) and a negative prior
class distribution of 0.8 (P(θP) = 0.8).
The last process is the Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes process which is shown in figure
4.9 and represents Naive Bayes Margin proposal. This process is described in the proposal section
3.3.2.
All of these models construction processes, with every 3 possible signatures and different
configurations (in the case of the models with variable percentage values) were tested using the
monte-carlo method for estimating performance (section 2.2.4.3). The monte-carlo experiments
configurations used were: training data size and testing data size of 30 and 10 percent of the data
,respectively.The number of repetitions in the model validation was different of 10 repetitions for
the models without any predefined parameter (Normal Naive Bayes and Maximal Positive Margin
Naive Bayes) and 5 repetitions for the models with predefined parameters (Undersample Naive
Bayes and Prior Naive Bayes). The reason behind the different number of repetitions in different
model validations relies on the total number of interactions that were required to obtain results. In
the models with predefined parameters, the validation requires to be done with different parameter
values in order to verify the differences that the parameter causes in the classification.
4.4 Results
The results displayed in this section are presented in the order in which the components were
studied and integrated. In all the models tested, the performance is measured by analysis of the
recall and precision of the classification process.
4.4.1 Normal Naive Bayes Results
The first stage of this project was to evaluate the performance of the standard Naive Bayes model.
This model is expected to have a poor performance due to the characteristics of the data. In the
methodology section (4.3) this process is named under Normal Naive Bayes Model.
Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 display the performance indicators of the Normal Naive Bayes
Model with the several signature types. The recall max value reaches around 6.7% for the model
using data with signature of type 1 and the precision reaches a maximum value around 11% for
the model using data with signature of type 2. The perfomance of this models is as expected, very
weak. The data unbalanced class characteristic forces more instances being classified as negative,
which results in low a recall and precision. Both values of best performance in recall and precision
in this model were reached using data with the designed aditional features.
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Figure 4.10: Normal Naive Bayes model using
data without signature
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Figure 4.11: Normal Naive Bayes model using
data with signature of type 1
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Figure 4.12: Normal Naive Bayes model using
data with signature of type 2
4.4.2 Undersampled Naive Bayes Results
The Undersample Naive Bayes Model (section 4.3) is the representation of a previously studied
solution to reduce the unbalanced data set effects. The hypothesis in evaluating this model is:
investigate what effects does a variable undersampling rate produces in the resulting models per-
formance.
Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 display the performance of the Undersampled Naive Bayes Model
built with the several signature types and the undersampling rate parameter ranging from 10% to
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Figure 4.13: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data without signature
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Figure 4.14: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data with signature of type 1
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Figure 4.15: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data with signature of type 2
100% with a 10% step. For an 10% undersampling rate the maximum recall was 17.5% for the
model of data with signature 2, and the maximum precision was 7.8% for the model of data without
signature. As the undersampling rate increases, the precision raises and the recall drops. This
effect is visible in the model with all the signature types. When the undersampling rate reaches
100%, the results should be similar to the Normal Naive Bayes Model, because no undersampled is
made. This is confirmed as the maximum recall reaches 6.2% for the model of data with signature
1 and the maximum precision reaches 10.5% for the model of data with signature 2.
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Figure 4.16: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data without signature (1% to 10% under-
sampling rate)
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Figure 4.17: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data with signature of type 1 (1% to 10%
undersampling rate)
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Figure 4.18: Undersampled Naive Bayes model
using data with signature of type 2 ( 1% to 10%
undersampling rate)
Figures 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 display the performance of the Undersampled Naive Bayes Model
with the several signature types but with undersampling rate ranging from 1% to 10% with a 1%
step. These results show that for an undersampling rate of 1% the recall reaches a maximum
of around 85% and the precision a maximum of 3.8% for the model of data without signature.
At 1% undersampling rate value, the negative prior class probability is smaller than the positive
prior probability in the Naive Bayes model which boosts the Positive classification. The recall
4.4 Results 41
has a drop in percentage between the undersampling rate of 2% and 3%. This is because, the
undersampling rate is in the range of values in which the class distribution reaches the even point
(P(θN)≈ P(θP)).
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Figure 4.19: Undersampled Naive Bayes model F1 Score (1% to 10% range)
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Figure 4.20: Undersampled Naive Bayes model F1 Score (10% to 100% range)
In conclusion, the reduction of the undersampling rate produces an increases of the positive
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prior class probability (P(θP)) in the Naive Bayes model which results in more calls being classi-
fied as Positive. Since more calls are classified as positive, the recall increases due to an increased
amount of True Positives classifications and the precision decreases due to an increase of the
amount of False Positives classifications. Yet the growth of the recall is faster then the decreasing
of the pricision as shown of figures 4.19 and 4.20.
4.4.3 Prior Naive Bayes Results
The Prior Naive Bayes Model (section 4.3) is the representation of the proposal Naive Bayes
Margin. The first hypothesis in the evaluation of this solution is: investigate how the changes in
the model prior class probabilities improve the ability to detect positive examples. The second
hypothesis is: investigate the diferences between this solution and the undersampled solution.
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Figure 4.21: Prior Naive Bayes model using
data without signature
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Figure 4.22: Prior Naive Bayes model using
data with signature of type 1
Figures 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23 display the performance of the Prior Naive Bayes Model with
the several signature types and the Prior Percentage Distribution (PPD) parameter ranging from
10% to 100% with a 10% step. For a PPD of 100% the results correspond to the original class
distribtion, which is around 98% (section 4.1). This results show an increasing precision and a
decreasing recall as the PPD increases. This is the result of the naive bayes model having a prior
class distribution (P(θ)) that changes from a major positive class (P(θP)> P(θN)) when the PPD
is below 50% to a major negative class (P(θN) > P(θP)) when the PPD is above 50%. The first
hypothesis is verified when the PPD has low values, which results in an increased positive classi-
fication due to the increased positive prior class probability in the Naive Bayes model. For a PPD
of 10% the recall reaches a maximum of 100% with a low precision. Same as the Undersampled
Naive Bayes Model the increased positive classification will generate more True Positives and
False Positives. The second hypothesis is verified in the prior attribute probability of the Naive
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Figure 4.23: Prior Naive Bayes model using
data with signature of type 2
Bayes model. In the Undersampled model, the undersampling task removes instances before con-
structing the model in order to balance the class distribution. This might remove some essential
information regarding the negative class, which later might compromise the classification process.
In the case of the Prior Naive Bayes Model, no information is removed and the desired prior class
distribution is defined manually.
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Figure 4.24: Prior Naive Bayes model F1 Score
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4.4.4 Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes Results
The Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes Model (section 4.3) is the representation of the Naive
Bayes Margin proposed solution. The hypothesis in this solution is:investigate how can the margin
between the the negative classification and the decision boundary be decreased in order to obtain
te detect more positive examples.
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Figure 4.25: Maximal Positive Margin Naive
Bayes model using data without signature
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Figure 4.26: Maximal Positive Margin Naive
Bayes model using data with signature of type
1
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Figure 4.27: Maximal Positive Margin Naive
Bayes model using data with signature of type
2
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Figures 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27 display the performance of the Maximal Positive Margin Naive
Bayes Model with the several signature types. In general, the precision has worsen value compared
to the Normal Naive Bayes model, maximun of around, 5% yet the recall is higher, maximum of
around 36%. This is because some of instances have been moved from the negative class to the
positive class, resulting in more True Positives (that justify the improved recall) and more False
Positives (decreased precision). In this solution, after applying the margin values to the model
results, the only effect that occurs to the results are some of the classified negative instances (True
Negatives and False Negatives) being converted into positives (True Positives and False Positives).
Table 4.1 displays the amount of instances that were converted to positives and the fraction that
those values correspond in the total amount of positive and negative instances. At a first glance
it is possible to see that applying this solution to data with all types of signatures, the fraction of
true positives (from the amount of positives instances) gained is bigger than the fraction of true
negatives (from the amount of negatives instances) lost.
Signature added TP added FP Pos. Fraction (%) Neg. Fraction (%)
No Signature +835 to +1781 +17267 to +40262 ≈ 15.0 to 32.0 ≈ 8.8 to 20.7
Type 1 +1008 to +1393 +23833 to +27537 ≈ 18.1 to 25.1 ≈ 12.3 to 14.2
Type 2 +1483 to +1726 +29890 to +44866 ≈ 26.7 to 31.1 ≈ 15.4 to 23.1
Table 4.1: Amount of converted positive intances and their corresponding label.
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Figure 4.28: Normal Naive Bayes Model ROC Curve
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Figure 4.29: Maximal Positive Margin Naive Bayes Model ROC Curve
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This project presented an evaluation over the effect that unbalanced class datasets have in the
classification algorithm Naive Bayes and measures to improve its performance. The analyses in
the standard Naive Bayes algorithm revealed the expected poor classification performance. As
a measure to improve the performance, one common method is to under sample the major class
data. This method allowed to control number of examples in the major class by ajusting the
undersampling rate. Controlling the class distribution translates in the control of the performance
of the classifier. Better results in the recall were achieved in the lower undersampling rate, whit a
trade-off with the precision.
Undersampling data before constructing the Naive Bayes classifier produces a trade-off be-
tween a good class distribution and a bad prior attribute distribution. The Naive Class Distribution
suggests a different approach by allowing to calibrate the class distribution without compromis-
ing the prior attribute distribution. his solution showed some similar results to the undersample
method.
The second proposal, Naive Bayes Margin, has the main objective of allowing more positive
classification. The ideal behind its development is to evaluate the negative margin to the decision
boundary and extend the positive margin without compromising the negative classification. This
concept is similar to a change in the decision boundary, by moving the decison boundary in the
negative direction, allowing for the positive margin to increase. This proposal results showed an
improve in the recall with a trade-off with the precision.
Besides the algorithm proposed and tested, in the data preparation stage, some additional
features were developed. These features improved in general all the models classification perfor-
mance.
In summary, as expected, our results showed that the standard Naive Bayes is not appropriate
for problems with an unbalanced class distribution. In the case study investigated in this project,
the combination of this algorithm with undersampling improved its performance in terms of recall
but not so much in terms of precision. The Naive Class Distribution and the Naive Bayes Margin
algorithms proposed in this project yielded results that are comparable with the combination of
standard Naive Bayes with undersampling. This shows that the proposed algorithms successfully
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address the issues of unbalanced class distributions. Concerning the case study investigated, the
results confirm that problem-specific data transformation can deeply affect the performance of the
classification models.
5.1 Future Work
A deeper investigation should be made concerning the behaviour and performance of the proposed
solutions. The Naive Class Distribution proposal can be improved in the method used to control
the Prior Percentage Distribution. In this work, the method used to evaluate the performance is by
trying different values and evaluating the results. An automated process that could calibrate this
value in a faster way to obtain a better classification.
The Naive Bayes Margin proposal, can be improved by creating further conditions in the ap-
plication of the marging values. The process of application of these values to the resulting pre-
dictions, only uses information regarding the classes. Some additional components, like other
attributes information, can be used to refine the margin values to be applied to the prediction.
Other possibility is to test the Naive Bayes Margin method in other types of classifiers since
the only requisite is for the classifier to output class probabilities for each instance. In the end, the
viability of this solutions should be tested in other types of data.
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